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Techniques for modelling the frequency of explosions
on offshore platforms
K J Foster and J D Andrews*
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK
Abstract: This paper describes a scheme by which the explosion frequencies and resulting overpres-
sures can be predicted for modules on an offshore platform. Given a leak of gas, the success and
failure of the isolation, blow-down and deluge systems, which are designed to activate following a
leak to mitigate the consequences, are considered. The frequency of each possible response to the
leak is predicted using a conventional event tree and fault tree approach. Each scenario has a
potential escape inventory, which together with the hole size distribution provides the escaping mass
flowrate. Once the flowrate into the module is established, the wind conditions are used to determine
the gas in air concentration build-up. The concentration profile with respect to time is linked to the
ignition source probabilities, from which calculations can be made to assess the likelihood that an
explosion will occur within a specific concentration range.
The initial models assume that the gas concentration at any specific time is uniform within the
locality of the leak. The work presented in this paper proposes an approach that determines the
explosion probability dependent on the volume fraction of gas within the module and the likelihood
of encountering an ignition source.
Keywords: explosion modelling, risk assessment, offshore
1 INTRODUCTION
The Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 led to reforms in
offshore safety regulations. As a result of the public
enquiry led by Lord Cullen [1], offshore operators are
required to demonstrate that the potential major haz-
ards of the installation and risks to personnel have been
identified and appropriate controls provided. On an
offshore platform, two of the major hazards are fires
and explosions resulting from an accidental hydrocar-
bon release. The overpressure generated during an ex-
plosion can threaten the integrity of the platform
structure. It is therefore important to be able to esti-
mate the overpressures generated, should an explosion
occur, and to predict the frequency of such an event.
A methodology has been developed to predict the
frequency of explosions of different magnitudes occur-
ring in a module on an offshore platform [2]. This
methodology combines established risk assessment
techniques, such as event tree analysis [3] and fault tree
analysis [4], with fluid flow modelling [5, 6]. Fault tree
and event tree methods are used to determine the
frequencies of occurrence of all possible scenarios re-
sulting from a leak of gas. Each scenario evolves from
the initial gas leak from a process section that can be
isolated. The event tree branch points determine
whether the gas detection system functions, the relevant
isolation and blow-down valves function and the deluge
system activates. A distribution of leak hole sizes is
considered. Using fluid flow modelling, the gas release
rate is computed, allowing the variation in the module
gas concentration with time to be calculated. The fre-
quency of an explosion is calculated by combining the
time that the concentration is between the flammable
limits with the predicted ignition rate. The magnitude
of the overpressures produced from an ignition are
determined from an empirical relationship produced by
British Gas described by Catlin et al. [7] and Gregory
and Johnson [8].
This paper presents two methods for calculating the
frequency of an explosion. The first method assumes
that the gas in air concentration within the module is
uniform; therefore an ignition source occurring at any
position will, given a flammable concentration, cause an
explosion. The ignition rate in this case is taken to
be constant. The second method requires the use of
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Fig. 1 Event tree identifying all possible outcomes following a gas leak on a specified section
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computational fluid dynamics (CFD) to determine the
concentration distribution throughout the module; such
correlations mean that it is possible to produce a rela-
tionship between the volume of the gas cloud within set
concentration limits and time. This method determines
the explosion frequency dependent on the volume frac-
tion of gas within the module and the likelihood of
encountering an ignition source.
2 FREQUENCIES OF EXPLOSIONS
The frequency of an explosion depends on:
(a) the frequency of leakage,
(b) the frequency of ignition,
(c) the time of detection of the gas concentration,
(d) the availability of explosion-mitigating systems,
(e) the reaction time of explosion-mitigating systems,
(f) the availability of a blow-down system,
(g) the availability of a gas detection system,
(h) the availability of an isolation system,
(i) the source strength of leakage,
(j) the pressure–time history of the section,
(k) the ventilation rate and
(l) the concentration–time history of the gas–air
mixture.
Event trees are used to determine all possible scenar-
ios. The event tree diagram represents the response to
the initiating event (gas leak) of the gas detection,
isolation, blow-down and water spray systems. For
example, see the event tree shown in Fig. 1 for a simple
situation where the leak has occurred on a section
bounded by two isolation valves and contains a single
blow-down valve. Following a significant leak, the de-
tection system should respond by activating the protec-
tion systems. Isolation valves will limit the leak
inventory of gas, if operating correctly. Blow-down
valves allow the gas to be burnt at the flare, reducing
the mass of gas and pressure in the leaking section.
Water spray systems activate to limit the consequences
of an explosion by reducing the overpressures pro-
duced. Fault trees are constructed to represent the
causes of the failure of each isolation valve, blow-down
valve, detection system and water spray. Hence the
frequency of each scenario occurring is obtained. The
event tree constructed in Fig. 1 has binary branching,
indicating that the detection, isolation, blow-down and
deluge are considered to be either totally successful or a
total failure. The method is flexible and can allow
multiple branching to incorporate partial failures. How-
ever, from a practical viewpoint, accurate probabilities
of such events are rarely available and it is felt that
considering such eventualities as total failures, i.e.
pessimistically, is the most sensible approach.
The state of the isolation and blow-down valves
determines the amount of gas available to leak and the
pressure within the section. The behaviour of the fluid
is modelled to obtain the mass flowrate of gas into the
module. The ventilation system on the platform is
assumed to be natural, dominated by the wind speed
and direction; therefore a distribution of ventilation
rates is considered. Utilizing the appropriate ventilation
rate, a concentration–time history of gas in air is
obtained for the module.
Ignition may only occur if the concentration of gas is
between the flammable limits. For natural gas the lower
flammable limit (LFL) is approximately 5 per cent and
the upper flammable limit (UFL) is 15 per cent. If
perfect mixing occurs and the gas concentration within
a fixed volume is assumed constant, then the concentra-
tion time history may be one of three forms. The
situation shown in Fig. 2a could not result in an
explosion, as the concentration of gas does not build up
to the flammable region. In Fig. 2b, ignition may occur
between T1 and T4. However, in Fig. 2c, ignition may
occur in two time periods, between T1 and T2, while the
concentration is rising and again between T3 and T4 as
it falls back between the flammable limits.
There are two categories of explosions dependent on
the availability of the water spray system: mitigated and
unmitigated. Mitigated explosions result in lower over-
pressures; see Fig. 3 taken from Catlin et al. [7]. Miti-
gated explosions occur when the water spray is
operational, for this we must consider the following
cases:
Fig. 2 Typical gas concentration–time histories: (a) the gas
concentration is always below the LFL; (b) the gas
concentration exceeds the LFL but not the UFL; (c)
the gas concentration exceeds the UFL
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Fig. 3 Variation in the overpressure as a function of concentration
(a) when the water system is initiated and then fails
prior to the gas concentration decreasing below the
LFL and there is an ignition prior to the deluge
failure;
(b) when the water spray functions throughout the
critical time period and an ignition occurs.
Unmitigated explosions occur as follows:
(a) when the water spray system fails to activate when
the gas is detected and ignition occurs;
(b) when the water spray activates but the gas ignites
during the delay time (prior to mitigation);
(c) when the water spray system activates and is fully
operational but then fails followed by ignition of
the gas (mitigation not maintained).
The frequency of an explosion will take one of the
following forms depending on whether the water spray
initially activates:
fe=P(S)lLP(E)P(WSFA) (1)
or
fe=P(S)lLP(E)[1−P(WSFA)] (2)
where P(S) is the probability of the event sequence
represented by each event tree outcome, lL is the
frequency of the gas leak, P(E) is the probability of
ignition and P(WSFA) is the probability that the water
system fails to activate.
Two methods have been considered to calculate the
ignition probability P(E) in equations (1) and (2). The
first method is computationally efficient but requires
strong assumptions regarding the gas dispersion. The
second method is proposed to overcome these limita-
tions but requires platform-specific CFD correlations to
be produced.
2.1 Method 1
The method assumes that, as gas is released, it instanta-
neously mixes with the air. The mixing is assumed to be
perfect, producing a uniform concentration of the gas-
in-air mixture throughout the module. This concentra-
tion is dependent upon the gas release rate, the relative
volume of the module into which the gas is released and
the ventilation rate. As long as the concentration is
within the flammable limits and an ignition source
occurs, an explosion is possible. In order to calculate
the frequency of occurrence of an explosion it is neces-
sary to know the frequency of occurrence of an ignition
source. The ignition rate is assumed to be a constant,
namely mi. This leads to occurrence times with a proba-
bility density function of
fi(t)=mi exp(−mit) (3)
The fluid modelling provides the gas volume flowrate
with respect to time into the module; by considering the
ventilation flowrate, profiles of the type illustrated in
Fig. 2 can be produced. When calculating the overpres-
sure distribution of an explosion, the explosive range
between the flammable limits is split into bands. This
allows the frequency of an explosion at a certain con-
centration of gas to be determined. From the concen-
tration at which ignition occurred, the British Gas
empirical relationships yield the resulting overpressures
generated for mitigated and unmitigated situations as
shown in Fig. 3.
2.2 Method 2
The second method models the gas cloud build-up. The
larger the gas cloud, the greater is the chance of en-
countering an ignition source. Instead of assuming per-
fect mixing of the gas and air in the module, CFD may
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be used to determine the concentration build-up of gas
throughout the module with time. This will enable
correlations for the time variation in the volume occupied
by a specific concentration range of gas to be established.
The concentration contours produced as the gas enters
the module will change position and shape with time. The
volume encased within each concentration band will
change with respect to time, as shown in Fig. 4 for a
specific concentration band. The exact form of this graph
will change for each scenario. In this example, the volume
builds up rapidly at first owing to a fast release rate. Once
the leak has exhausted, the volume reduces, as deter-
mined by the ventilation rate.
It is possible that the variation may be represented by
a skewed function such as a log-normal function of the
form
V(t)=
1
st
exp
!
−
1
2
ln(t)−8
s
n2"
(4)
where 8 and s are the function parameters. Such a
function is capable of representing the increase in volume
as the gas is released and the decrease as ventilation
dominates and the gas is exhausted.
To calculate the frequencies of explosions an ignition
density is used rather than an ignition rate. In this case
the probability of ignition is dependent on the ignition
density and the dispersion and concentration of the gas
cloud. For a specific concentration band m, the volume
of gas follows a function Vm(t). The ignition rate is then
liVm(t) (5)
where li is the ignition rate per unit volume. This leads
to a probability density function for the ignition source
occurrence times of:
fi(t)=liVm(t) exp

−li
& t
0
Vm(u) du
n
(6)
The modelling provides the times at which each
concentration band develops and then disappears and the
volume within this band. It is assumed that the lowest
concentration band is the first to be reached and the last
to be left, and that the highest is the last to be reached
and the first to be left. Therefore, if tEm is the time that
band m is entered and tLm is the time that band m is left,
the following must apply:
tE1B tE2B ···B tL2B tL1 (7)
3 CALCULATIONS
The probability that ignition occurs within a specific
concentration range is dependent upon the form of the
ignition source probability function. Different calcula-
tion procedures result from the two methods described
above.
3.1 Ignition probability calculations for method 1
When the form of the distribution of times between
ignition source occurrences is given by equation (3), the
following equations show how P(E), the ignition proba-
bility, can be determined for a specific concentration
band. For each concentration band there will be entering
and leaving times; these will be denoted t1m, t2m, t3m and
t4m if the upper limit of that concentration band is
exceeded; otherwise, if the concentration begins to fall
while in the band, there will be only t1m and t4m, where
m refers to the specific concentration band. An ignition
occurring in this band depends on which of the situations
shown in Fig. 2 occurs. Ignition may only take place if
it has not occurred previously within any of the concen-
tration bands. For the case when the concentration band
exceeds the UFL (Fig. 2c), the probability that ignition
occurs in band m is
P(E)=P [(ignition at time 6 between t1m and t2m
AND no ignition between T1 and 6) OR
(ignition at time 6 between t3m and t4m AND
no ignition between T1 and T2 or T3 and 6)]
(8)
Thus
Fig. 4 Example of the expected growth and decay of the volume within a concentration band, using the
log-normal function
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P(E)=
& t2m
t 1m
fi(6)

1−
& 6
T 1
fi(u) du
n
d6
+
& t4m
t 3m
fi(6)

1−
& T2
T 1
fi(u) du−
& 6
T 3
fi(u) du
n
d6
(9)
When the concentration does not exceed the UFL (Fig.
2b), T2 and T3 do not exist. There are two situations
that could apply: firstly, the concentration may exceed
the UFL of the specific band, therefore giving times t1m,
t2m, t3m and t4m ; secondly, the concentration may exceed
the LFL but not the UFL, only giving times t1m and
t4m. For the first situation, equation (9) reduces to
P(E)=
& t2m
t 1m
fi(6)

1−
& 6
T 1
fi(u) du
n
d6
+
& t4m
t 3m
fi(6)

1−
& 6
T 1
fi(u) du
n
d6 (10)
For the second situation, equation (10) is modified to
P(E)=
& t4m
t 1m
fi(6)

1−
& 6
T 1
fi(u) du
n
d6 (11)
Equations (9) to (11) give the ignition probability
that can be substituted into equations (1) and (2) to
yield the explosion frequency. If it is required to distin-
guish between the proportion of these explosions which
are mitigated and those which are unmitigated, then
equations (9) to (11) need to account for the failure,
once running, of the deluge system.
Considering first the probability that the ignition
occurs prior to activation of the water spray. This
situation needs to account for the delay time from the
detection of the gas to the initiation of the water spray
and to the start of the deluge, namely td. If tdB t 1m,
then this type of ignition cannot occur within that
concentration band whereas, if td\ t4m, this type of
ignition may take place at any time within the band; the
probability of this is as in equation (9). The position of
td relative to t1m− t4m must be established, as for each
case the probability equation will take the same form as
equation (9), (10) or (11) with different limits of
integration.
The probability that ignition occurs after the mitiga-
tion fails, given that it was activated, also depends on
the delay time td and the failure frequency of the
mitigation system. It is assumed that the failure rate of
the water deluge system is constant, lws, leading to a
failure density function
fws(u)=lws exp (−lwsu) (12)
To determine the probability of ignition in this case, the
timing of the water spray delay must be considered to
establish when such an unmitigated explosion could
occur.
For tdB t1m, failure of the deluge system at time u
and occurrence of ignition at 6\u, then the probability
of an unmitigated ignition is
P(E)=
& t1m
t d
fws(u)
!& t2m
t 1m
fi(6)

1−
& 6
T 1
fi(s) ds
n
d6
+
& t4m
t 3m
fi(6)

1−
& T2
T 1
fi(s) ds−
& 6
T 3
fi(s) ds
n
d6
"
du
+
& t2m
t 1m
fws(u)
!& t2m
u
fi(6) d6

1−
& 6
T 1
fi(s) ds
n
+
& t4m
t 3m
fi(6)

1−
& T2
T 1
fi(s) ds−
& 6
T 3
fi(s) ds
n
d6
"
du
+
& t3m
t 2m
fws(u)
!& t4m
t 3m
fi(6)

1−
& T2
T 1
fi(s) ds
−
& 6
T 3
fi(s) ds
n
d6
"
du
+
& t4m
t 3m
fws(u)
!& t4m
u
fi(6)

1−
& T2
T 1
fi(s) ds
−
& 6
T 3
fi(s) ds
n
d6
"
du (13)
If td occurs at other points, then again the limits will
change for the other situations.
An ignition when there is mitigation can occur in one
of two ways. Either the water could function continu-
ously throughout the flammable time duration or an
ignition could occur at some point prior to its failure
during this time period after its activation. As an
example, if tdB t1m and the ignition occurs at time 6
prior to failure of the deluge system at time u\6, then
the probability of a mitigated ignition is
P(E)=

1−
& t4m
t d
fws(u) du
n
×
!& t2m
t 1m
fi(6)

1−
& 6
T 1
fi(s) ds
n
d6
+
& t4m
t 3m
fi(6)

1−
& T2
T 1
fi(s) ds−
& 6
T 3
fi(s) ds
n
d6
"
+
& t2m
t 1m
fws(u)
!& u
t 1m
fi(6)

1−
& 6
T 1
fi(s) ds
n
d6
"
du
+
& t3m
t 2m
fws(u)
!& t2m
t 1m
fi(6)

1−
& 6
T 1
fi(s) ds
n
d6
"
du
+
& t4m
t 3m
fws(u)
!& t2m
t 1m
fi(6)

1−
& 6
T 1
fi(s) ds
n
d6
+
& u
t 3m
fi(6)

1−
& T2
T 1
fi(s) ds−
& 6
T 3
fi(s) ds
n
d6
"
du
(14)
where the first term relates to the functioning of the
water spray continuously over the time period and the
following terms relate to failure of the water spray. For
all other situations where td occurs at other time points
tdE t1m, the limits will change as appropriate. The
results gained by applying this approach have been
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Fig. 5 Representation of the volume variation for each concentration band with time
derived and have been described in detail by Foster and
Andrews [9].
3.2 Ignition probability calculations for method 2
As with method 1, this method assumes that an ignition
will only occur at time t if it has not occurred previously
while a gas cloud existed which was within the explosive
range. Method 1 involves integrating the probability
density function for the ignition source using limits of
integration that relate to the times of entry and exit for
each concentration band over the flammable region. In
this case, however, it is more complex. Each concentration
range has its own probability density function that
depends on the volume of the gas cloud within the
concentration band limits. Therefore each time interval
in equation (7), i.e. tE1 to tE2, tE2 to tE3, etc., must be
considered. These are illustrated in Fig. 5 where the
variation in the volume with time for each band is assumed
not to intersect.
Consider first the probability of a gas cloud ignition
at time 6 :
P(E)= %
n−1
k=m
& tE(k+1)
t Ek
fim(6)

1− %
k
j=1
& 6
t Ej
fij(s) ds
n
d6
+
& tLn
t En
fim(6)

1− %
n
j=1
& 6
t Ej
fij(s) ds
n
d6
+ %
n−1
k=m
& tLk
t L(k+1)
fim(6)

1− %
n
j=k+1
& tLj
t Ej
fij(s) ds
− %
k
l=1
& 6
t El
fil(s) ds
n
d6 (15)
P(E)=
& tEm
t d
fws(u)
 %n−1
k=m
!& tE(k+1)
t Ek
fim(6)

1− %
k
j=1
& 6
t Ej
fij(s) ds
n
d6
"
+
& tLn
t En
fim(6)

1− %
n
j=1
& 6
t Ej
fij(s) ds
n
d6
+ %
n−1
k=m
!& tLk
t L(k+1)
fim(6)

1− %
n
j=k+1
& tLj
t Ej
fij(s) ds− %
k
l=1
& 6
t El
fil(s) ds
n
d6
"
du
+ %
n−1
j=m
& tE( j+1)
t Ej
fws(u)
 %n−1
k= j+1
!& tE (k+1)
tEk
fim(6)

1− %
k
l=1
& 6
t El
fil(s) ds
n
d6
"
+
& tLn
t En
fim(6)

1− %
n
l=1
& 6
t El
fil(s) ds
n
d6
where n is the number of concentration bands, P(E) is
the probability of ignition while the concentration is
in band m and fij is the probability density function
for the ignition source for band j. The first term considers
the intervals between the entering times for each concen-
tration band; e.g. if only the first concentration band
has been reached, then it is unnecessary to consider
the ignition density function relating to the other bands
as ignition cannot yet occur within those ranges. How-
ever, as the gas release develops and the higher concen-
tration bands are entered, more terms are added to
account for the other ignition density functions of
the other bands. The second term considers the time
interval between entering and leaving the last band
within the flammable limits. The final term accounts for
the time intervals between the exit of each band which
reduces the number of density functions that need to be
considered.
To evaluate the proportions of these explosions that
are unmitigated, the situation where the ignition happens
before the water spray is activated needs to be considered.
The calculations for this will be as in equation (15) with
the limits changed to account for the time in the release
at which the deluge activates.
Explosions occurring after the failure of the activated
water spray depend on the activation time and the failure
rate of the water spray system. The deluge failure rate
is again assumed to be a constant, leading to the failure
density function of equation (12). The activation time with
respect to the limiting times of each band is considered.
For the case when tdB tEm, the probability of ignition
in band m at time 6 is
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+ %
n−1
k=m
!& tLk
t L(k+1)
fim(6)

1− %
n
l=k+1
& tLl
t El
fil(s) ds− %
k
l=1
& 6
t El
fil(s) ds
n
d6
"
+
& tE( j+1)
u
fim(6)

1− %
j
l=1
& 6
t El
fil(s) ds
n
d6

du
+
& tLn
t En
fws(u)
& tLn
u
fim(6)

1− %
n
j=1
& 6
t Ej
fij(s) ds
n
d6
+ %
n−1
k=m
!& tLk
t L(k+1)
fim(6)

1− %
n
j=k+1
& tLj
t Ej
fij(s) ds− %
k
l=1
& 6
t El
fil(s) ds
n
d6
"
du
+ %
n−1
j=m
& tLj
t L( j+1)
fws(u)
& tLj
u
fim(6)

1− %
j
l=1
& 6
t El
fil(s) ds− %
n
l= j+1
& tLl
t El
fil(s) ds
n
d6
+ %
j−1
k=m
!& tLk
t L(k+1)
fim(6)

1− %
n
l=k+1
& tLl
t El
fil(s) ds− %
k
l=1
& 6
t El
fil(s) ds
n
d6
"
du
(16)
For all other intervals, equation (16) is used with a change of integration limits.
Similarly, for ignition occurring when the water spray is active, the probability of ignition when tdB tEm is
P(E)=

1−
& tLm
t d
fws(u) du
n %n−1
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4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Two methods to predict the explosion frequencies fol-
lowing a gas release on an offshore platform have
been presented in this paper. In addition to the over-
all explosion frequency, both methods allow the gas-
in-air concentration and the deluge status to be
identified at the point of ignition, thereby enabling
the explosion frequencies to be linked to the resulting
overpressures in the form of a distribution. This en-
ables the determination of the frequency with which
an explosion where overpressures exceed the design
limit can be expected, and the design adequacy estab-
lished. Typical results obtained from these methodolo-
gies have been given by Andrews et al. [2].
Other useful information which can be obtained
from this type of analysis, particularly if conducted at
the design stage, are the contributions to the overall
or design limit explosion frequency of
(a) an explosion following a leak on a specified isolat-
able section,
(b) an explosion following the failure of any isolation
valve or
(c) an explosion following the failure of any blow-
down valve.
These quantities are known as importance measures
and indicate the weak points in the system design and
highlight where the most cost effective design changes
can be made.
The two methods presented require different input
data (e.g. ignition rate versus ignition rate density, or
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fixed cloud size versus time-variable cloud size). Depen-
dent on the numerical values given to these factors, one
model will not consistently provide higher predictions
than the other (i.e. one method does not provide an
upper bound).
The choice of the model applied will be dependent on
the resources and information available to the analyst.
The second method takes account of the variable gas
cloud size due to the release rate decay and the effect of
ventilation. To obtain such a correlation requires the
platform module geometry to be considered together
with a range of leak rates, ventilation rates and leak
positions entailing a significant number of CFD runs.
This approach, while requiring the additional work, is
considered to have the potential to produce more accu-
rate predictions.
The advantage of the first method presented is that it
is less computationally intensive and requires more
easily obtainable data. Its limiting assumption is that of
perfect mixing. This has recently been shown to be
valid, particularly for the higher release rates, by exper-
imental work conducted by British Gas plc. In view of
the uncertainties in much of the data available, this
more efficient approach may provide an effective means
by which decisions regarding the design adequacy of
platforms may be influenced.
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